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Whether for want of time, expertise, or political will, Congress frequently
drafts laws that leave important questions unanswered. Ever since the New
Deal era, administrative agencies have resolved these questions pursuant to
broad delegations of authority from Congress.' For decades, academics have
debated the appropriate role for the President in the process of settling such
2questions. In practice, the President and the President's staff often exert
+ Associate Dean and Professor, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. B.S., J.D.
Villanova University, LL.M. George Washington University School of Law.
1. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2253 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (1994); Kagan, supra note 1, at 2247; Lawrence
Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2-3
(1994); Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 263, 264 (2006); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or 'The Decider'? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 696-97 (2007).
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strong influence over agencies in their resolution of the unanswered questions.3
Frequently, though, the President's hand is invisible in the records created by
the agencies to justify their decisions.4 Rather than documenting political
influences, the agencies often support their decisions with technocratic
explanations that are tied to the factors that Congress explicitly authorized
them to consider in implementing the statute.5
Despite the apparent congressional delegation of authority to administrative
agencies to address certain questions unresolved by various statutes, several
academics have asserted that it is entirely appropriate for the President to play
a central role in the agencies' deliberative process, but that something must be
done to make the role of the President in the decision-making process more
6transparent. Several academics, including Professor Kathryn Watts and
recently appointed Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, suggest that courts
should accord more deference to agency decisions that are based on
presidential influences. This would increase transparency of agency decision
making, as agencies would be required to disclose those influences in order to
receive the increased deference. Professor Nina Mendelson has suggested a
more direct approach.9 She advocates new legislation or an executive order
requirin0 agencies to disclose presidential influences in their decision
making.
Although the goal of increasing transparency in the rulemaking process is
admirable, the proposals could have some unintended consequences, such as
contributing to further ossification of the rulemaking process and encouraging
further partisan review by courts.' In addition, making agency rulemaking
responsive to the political winds that change with each new administration
might reduce consistency and certainty for the regulated industries regarding
their obligations under the law. 12 Although those may be acceptable trade-offs
3. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing 'Political' Oversight of Agency Decision-Making, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1146 (2010); see also Kagan, supra note 1, at 2248-51 (discussing the
Clinton administration's efforts to influence agency policymaking); Strauss, supra note 2, at
701-02 (explaining President Bush's Executive Order 13,422 and its effect of increasing
presidential control over agency action).
4. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1147-57.
5. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2009); see also Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1141 (noting that courts
generally have not provided clear guidance on whether agency action may permissibly be based
on political reasons, but have been explicit that such reasons are never acceptable if they prompt a
decision based on factors not related to the statute).
6. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2251-52; Mendelson, supra note 3, at 159-66; Watts,
supra note 5, at 32-45.
7. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2377; Watts, supra note 5, at 8-9.
8. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2372-73.
9. See Mendelson, supra note 3, at I164-65.
10. Id.
11. See infra Parts V.F-G.
12. See infra Part V.H.
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in exchange for increased transparency, it is questionable whether the
proposals will effectively promote full disclosure of presidential influence in
agency rulemaking.13
This Article examines some of the limitations of the approaches suggested
by Professors Watts and Mendelson, as well as some of the problems that each
approach could create. Part I of this Article outlines the debate surrounding
the appropriate role of the President in influencing or controlling an agency's
rulemaking. Part II explores the degree to which courts have addressed the
effect of presidential influence when applying either the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or the
Chevron test. Part III examines the proposals for changing the nature of
judicial review to increase deference for agencies when their decisions are
based on presidential influence, and Part IV discusses Professor Mendelson's
proposal to mandate disclosure of such influences. Finally, Part V critiques
both the Mendelson and Watts proposals, highlighting potential concerns and
unintended consequences associated with each of the suggested reforms.
I. PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE OR CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
DECISION MAKING
For decades, academics have debated what the appropriate role of the
President should be in the process of resolving unanswered statutory questions,
particularly when Congress has delegated authority to administrative agencies
to implement those laws.14 As the President will ultimately be held
accountable in national elections for the actions taken by executive-branch
agencies, the President has an incentive to exert strong influence over the
resolution of those unanswered questions or even to direct an agency to resolve
such questions in a particular manner. 15 Supporters of broad presidential
authority cite several constitutional bases for that power, arguing that it is
either encompassed within the President's executive power,16 delegated to the
President in the Take Care Clause of the Constitution,17 or inherent in the
President's removal power.' 8  Although the Supreme Court has clearly
13. See infra Part V.
14. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Although the broader debate focuses on the
President's authority over agency decision making in a variety of contexts, the focus of this
Article is limited to the President's influence over executive-branch agencies in the rulemaking
context. It does not explore the President's authority over independent agencies or the President's
influence over executive-branch agencies in the context of adjudication.
15. See Stack, supra note 2, at 264.
16. "Unitary executive" theorists argue that Article 11 of the Constitution implicitly
authorizes the President to control both executive and independent administrative agencies.
Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1132.
17. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1131-32; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
18. As Professor Stack notes, advocates for directive authority inherent in the removal
power argue that "at least with regard to officers that the President may remove at will, the
President can ensure that they will follow his will such that there is little practical difference
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indicated that the President cannot order an agency official to withhold a
ministerial action that the official is required to perform by law,19 the Court has
never clearly outlined the limits on the President's authority to require agency
officials to take action when a statute gives these officials discretion regarding
appropriate action.20 Over the years, Attorneys General have often been in
disagreement about the limits of the President's constitutional power to direct
an agency's discretion to be exercised in a manner favored by the President.21
Support for broad presidential authority to influence agency rulemaking, and
perhaps even to direct it, has grown as academics have increasingly argued for
a "presidential control" model to justify the existence and role of
administrative agencies.22  One of the strongest recent advocates for broad
presidential authority to direct agency action is the recently appointed Supreme
Court Justice Elena Kagan. In an influential article at the turn of this century,
Kagan argued that congressional delegations of authority to executive-branch
officials should be read to grant the President authority to direct the officials in
23their exercise of authority under those laws. In light of the power that the
President's appointment and removal powers, his ability to require them to
comply with extensive procedures in making decisions, and the deference that
executive-branch agency officials give to the President, Justice Kagan
between removal and directive authority, and therefore little reason to presume a 'congressional
intent to disaggregate them."' Stack, supra note 2, at 293 (quoting Kagan, supra note 1, at 2328).
19. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 610 (1838).
20. See Stack, supra note 2, at 270.
21. See id Compare The President and Accounting Officers, I Op. Att'y Gen. 624, 625
(1823) (finding that the Take Care Clause of the Constitution does not authorize the President to
direct an executive official to exercise discretion in a specific manner when Congress has
delegated authority to the official to exercise discretion), with Relation of the President to
Executive Departments, 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 453, 463, 469-70 (1855) (finding, in the opinion of
Attorney General Caleb Cushing, that the President has the implied authority, derived from the
executive power and the Take Care Clause, to control the manner in which executive officials
exercise discretion under statutes).
22. See Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1137. The presidential-control model for
administrative law places significant power in the hands of the President because the President
must be responsive to voters, can take a national perspective on policy issues, and has an
incentive to transmit broad electoral preferences to agencies. Id. at 1137-38. The
presidential-control model is the latest in a line of theories advanced by academics to support the
legitimacy of administrative agencies in the absence of explicit constitutional authority. The
earliest model, the "transmission belt" model, justified agencies "as merely implementing clear
legislative directives." Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 470 (2003). Over time, that
model was replaced by an "expertise" model, which envisioned agencies as "professionals or
experts, disciplined in their craft by 'the knowledge that comes from specialized experience."' Id
at 471 (quoting Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1975)). The expertise model was later replaced in the 1970s by an "interest
group representation" model, which touted the administrative process as "a perfected political
process, attempting to legitimate it by affording access to a wider range of affected interests." Id.
at 475.
23. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2329.
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concluded that "when Congress delegates to an executive official, it in some
necessary and obvious sense also delegates to the President." 24  Steven
Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash also assert that when statutes delegate
authority to an executive official, the President should be authorized to
exercise that authority in place of the official.25 Professor Kevin Stack notes
that academics implicitly assert a similar broad authority for Presidents when
claiming that a President's executive orders can legally bind executive-branch
26
agencies.
Supporters of the presidential-control model identify many benefits for a
broad distribution of power. The primary benefit is that the agency is more
accountable to the electorate when its rulemaking is controlled by the
President, who is subject to a national election. 27 Professor Nina Mendelson
suggests that agencies are likely to be more democratically responsive when
they are electorally accountable.28 She also argues that agency decisions can
be normatively better when the President exerts control over those decisions
because the President can (1) "ensure that decision-making across multiple
federal agencies is coordinated;" (2) "provide direction and energy to agency
officials;" and (3) ensure that agencies are not taking a "tunnel vision"
approach to decision making, focusing solely on their own priorities.29
The voices in favor of presidential power to direct executive-branch agency
officials' decision making, however, are not unanimous. 30  For instance,
Professor Peter Strauss asserts that the Take Care Clause and the Vesting
Clause of Article II of the Constitution, viewed in light of Congress's
delegation of decision-making authority to agency officials, provide the
President with the power simply to oversee executive-agency officials'
31decisions, rather than to make decisions for them. Professor Kevin Stack
24. Id at 2327. Professor Kagan based her conclusion, in part, on the contrast between
congressional delegations to independent agencies and executive agencies, noting that Congress
aims "to insulate agency decision-making from the President's influence" when delegating
authority to independent agencies because the President has limited removal power over those
agency officials. Id
25. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 596 & n.210.
26. Stack, supra note 2, at 266.
27. See Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1129, 1134; see also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED,
CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 153 (1997)
(arguing that without the ability to directly influence agencies, Presidents could only respond to
voter sentiment by lobbying Congress).
28. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1134.
29. Id at 1135.
30. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 54; Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control ofRegulatory
Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 462 (1987).
31. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 704-05. Professor Strauss appears to agree with Attorney
General Wirt, who concluded that the President's Article 11 duty to see that the laws "be faithfully
executed" includes a duty to respect the independent judgment of executive agency officials
authorized by statutes to make discretionary decisions. See id. at 703; supra note 21 (comparing
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makes a strong argument in support of this position based on principles of
statutory interpretation. 32
11. PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON JUDICIAL REVIEW
Regardless of whether it is appropriate for the President to direct or merely
influence agency decision making, the President plays an important role in the
process. Until recently, however, it was also fairly clear that courts would not
accord more deference to an agency's decision when reviewing it under the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard33 or the Chevron test 34 simply because the
agency's decision was motivated by the President's influence.
A. Arbitrary-and-Capricious Standard
The primary case to address the issue in the context of the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard is Motor Vehicle Manufacturers'Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co..3 In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed
the decision of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
to rescind a rule that required cars to be equipped with air bags or automatic
seat belts.36 The agency made the decision to rescind the rule, established
during the Carter administration, shortly after President Reagan was elected.3
The Court concluded that the NHTSA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when
it rescinded the rule because the agency failed to consider whether it should
retain an air-bag-only requirement, as opposed to a requirement for air bags or
the differing opinions of Attorney General William Wirt and Attorney General Caleb Cushing
concerning the President's constitutional authority to direct agency officials). Strauss argues that
"where Congress has assigned a function to a named agency subject to its oversight and the
discipline of judicial review, the President's role-like that of the Congress and the courts-is
that of overseer and not decider." Id. at 704-05.
32. See Stack, supra note 2, at 284-90; see also infra Part V.A.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
34. In Chevron, U.S.A, Inc.. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court
articulated a two-part test that frequently applies to review of agencies' interpretations of statutes:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
35. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
36. See id. at 34-37.
37. See id at 37-38.
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automatic seat belts, and because the agency did not adequately justify its
conclusion that automatic seat belts did not provide adequate safety benefits.38
Then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist concurred with the majority's
finding that the NHTSA failed to explain why it rescinded the air bag
requirement, but dissented from the finding that the NHTSA's decision
regarding the automatic seat belts was arbitrary and capricious.39 In his
opinion, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The agency's changed view of the standard seems to be related to the
election of a new President of a different political party . . . . A
change in administration . . . is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its
programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within the
bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative
records and evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the
administration. 40
The majority, however, did not address the political context of the agency's
decision, and did not address whether it would be appropriate for the agency to
consider such political influences in its decision making. 41  Instead, the
majority opinion focused on the technocratic explanations provided by the
42
agency. Consequently, as Professor Kathryn Watts has noted, "the opinion
has been widely read over time to represent the triumph of expertise to the
exclusion of politics."43 The Court's decision demonstrates the importance of
an agency's justification of their rules based on "technocratic, scientific, or
statutory driven terms, not political terms." 44
More recently, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court concluded that
the Environmental Protection Agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
denying a petition that asked the agency to re ulate automobile emissions of
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.4 The agency's decision was
strongly influenced by the White House, and the agency expressly indicated
that it based its decision, in part, on concerns about preserving the President's
ability to negotiate greenhouse-gas emissions reductions with developing
38. Id at 46-48, 51-57.
39. Id. at 57-58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. Id at 59 (footnote omitted).
41. Watts, supra note 5, at 19. Professor Watts argues, however, that the majority never
explicitly rejected Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that an agency could consider politics in its
decision making. Id. Instead, she argued, "the Court's silence on the issue most likely was
simply a reflection of the fact that the agency and the litigants had not teed up the issue." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. Professor Watts points out that the majority probably did not address the political
context in which the decision took place because the NHTSA did not indicate that it considered
any political factors in making its decision. Id
44. Id at 5.
45. 549 U.S. 497, 510-11, 532-34 (2007).
2011] 1009
Catholic University Law Review
countries and concerns about the efficacy of relying on voluntary executive-
branch programs to address climate change.46 Academics frequently cite this
decision as an affirmation of State Farm's "requirement" that agencies base
their decisions on scientific, technocratic, and statutory expertise, rather than
political factors.47
B. Chevron Deference
Although courts generally have not granted greater deference to agencies'
statutory interpretations under the Chevron analysis simply because the
agencies' decisions have been influenced by the President, the Chevron
decision itself is ambiguous regarding the role of presidential influence in
agency decision making-partly because the opinion identified several
different rationales for according deference to an agency's statutory
interpretation.48  Professor Evan Criddle notes that scholars have debated
whether courts defer to agencies under Chevron because (1) Congress has
delegated authority to the agencies, (2) the agencies have developed expertise,
(3) there is a need for national uniformity, (4) the agencies' decisions are made
through a deliberativel rational process, or (5) the executive branch is
politically accountable. As Criddle notes, there is support for each of these
justifications for deference in the Court's opinion in Chevron.50 If Chevron
requires deference to agencies because Congress has delegated decision-
making authority to the agencies being reviewed by courts, it would make little
sense to accord an agency greater deference because the President exerted
some influence over a decision. Similarly, if Chevron requires deference
because an agency has developed expertise, one might argue that an agency's
decision should be accorded less deference when based on presidential
52influence, rather than the agency's independent expertise.
However, many commentators argue that the primary justification for
Chevron deference is the political accountability justification, 53 and there is
46. Id at 511-14.
47. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 53-54; Mendelson, supra note 3, at
1140-41; Watts, supra note 5, at 21-22.
48. See Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1272-73, 1289-90
(2008).
49. Id at 1273.
50. Id. Professor Criddle argues that the "genius" of Justice Stevens' opinion is that it is
"pluralistic" and "conciliatory," providing "jurists who espouse fundamentally different views
regarding the relationship between courts and administrative agencies" with an array of
justifications supporting deference for agencies' decision making. Id. at 1273-74.
5 1. Congressional delegation is arguably the primary rationale for Chevron deference. Id. at
1284.
52. Many commentators identify agency expertise as a primary justification for Chevron
deference. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 48, at 1286; Stack, supra note 2, at 305.
53. See Criddle, supra note 48, at 1288-90 (discussing the political accountability
justification for Chevron deference).
1010 [Vol. 60: 1
Disclosing the President's Role in Rulemaking
strong support for their arguments in the following statements from Justice
Stevens's opinion:
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to
the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for
this political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices . . .54
Professor Kathryn Watts argues that this language, contrasted with the
majority's silence regarding political influences in State Farm, suggests that
presidential influence over agency decision making is valid in some cases, and
that the Court "anchored the political control model" for administrative
agencies in Chevron.55
If Chevron deference is based on the political accountability of the
President, presidential influence should play a central role in the Chevron
analysis.56  For instance, prior to her appointment to the Supreme Court,
Justice Elena Kagan argued that the delegation of authority to
executive-branch agencies should be viewed as delegating authority to the
President to direct those agencies' actions,57 and that agencies' decisions
should be accorded Chevron deference whenever those decisions have been
substantially influenced by the President.5 8
Though political accountability is a popular justification for Chevron
deference, critics argue that because very few agency decisions are influenced
by direct presidential actions, it is inappropriate to suggest that accountability
should be the touchstone for Chevron deference.59 Critics also argue that even
when the President is directly involved in an agency's decision making,
Chevron deference would not be appropriate if it would frustrate other
traditionally articulated bases for deference, such as agency expertise.60
54. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
55. Watts, supra note 5, at 37-38 (quoting Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in
Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1765 (2007)).
56. See Criddle, supra note 48, at 1288-89 (commenting on the President's oversight of
regulatory policy). Professor Kevin Stack notes that courts accord Chevron deference to
decisions of independent agencies, as well as executive-branch agencies, suggesting that Chevron
applies whenever the executive branch has greater influence over agencies than the judiciary. See
Stack, supra note 2, at 305.
57. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2251.
58. See id at 2377. Justice Kagan argues that Chevron deference should not be limited to
an agency's interpretation of a statute it "administers." Id Rather, Justice Kagan would expand
the traditional confines of Chevron and accord deference whenever the President influences an
agency's interpretation of a statute. Id. at 1276.
59. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 48, at 1289-90.
60. Id at 1290. Professor Peter Strauss argues that
2011] 1011
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Professor Stack raises another challenge to the expansion of Chevron
deference based on presidential influence, which will be discussed more fully
in Part V of this Article. In short, he disagrees with Justice Kagan regarding
the President's authority to direct agency decision making, and asserts that
presidential influence on decision making is only relevant for Chevron when a
statute expressly delegates authority to the President to play a decision-making
role.61
III. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: CHANGING THE APPLICATION OF THE
ARBITRARY-AND-CAPRICIOUS STANDARD
Although courts have been reluctant to do so in the past, several academics
have argued that courts should accord more deference to agencies when
reviewing their actions under the "hard look" application of the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard if the agencies' decisions are influenced by political
factors.62 Professor Kathryn Watts is one of the strongest advocates for this
position.63 Professor Watts argues that as the political-control model of
administrative agencies has become predominant, it is necessary to adapt
administrative law doctrines to reflect the increased focus on, and
appropriateness of, political influence in agency decision making. 64  Her
proposal is, in some ways, an expansion of Professor Kagan's proposal to
expand Chevron deference to agencies when the agencies' decisions are based
on presidential influence. 65 Professor Watts's proposal focuses on expanding
[i]n the ordinary world of administrative law, courts have extensive review authority
over decisions such as the EPA made in Chevron-review authority extending to their
reasonableness in terms of the agency's mandate. To make Chevron turn entirely on
presidential politics is to omit consideration of the role of 'reasonableness' in relation
to those matters found to fall within the area of discretion constituting 'step two' of its
analysis. . .. Indeed, the structure of judicial review of administrative action depends,
top to bottom, on the presumption that the matter being reviewed is in some respects
the product of an expert, not merely a political judgment.
Strauss, supra note 2, at 751-52 (footnote omitted). Strauss notes that "the professional civil
service within any particular agency serves as an anchor against the influence of raw politics in
the exercise of delegated responsibilities." Id. at 756. Strauss also questions whether, assuming
political accountability is a basis for according deference to agencies, it is appropriate to focus
simply on the influence of the President as the spokesperson of the national will, as opposed to
the President and Congress. Id at 755.
61. Stack, supra note 2, at 267.
62. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
63. See Watts, supra note 5, at 8-9 (summarizing her argument).
64. Id. at 32-39. Professor Watts asserts that the traditional application of the "hard look"
analysis is based on an outdated "expertise" model for administrative agencies. Id. at 33. She
suggests that the modem "political control" model has already prompted changes in other
administrative law doctrines addressing ex parte communications and application of the Chevron
test, making it appropriate to change the "hard look" analysis to reflect the new model as well.
Id. at 39.
65. Id. at 31-32 (commending Justice Kagan's proposal, but finding it to fall short of the
necessary reform needed).
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deference to agencies under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard when
agencies' decisions are based on political influences, not merely presidential
*66influences.
However, Professor Watts does not advocate changing the application of the
"hard look" arbitrary-and-capricious standard for all agency decisions. In her
article, she primarily focuses on denials of rulemaking petitions, withdrawals
of proposed rules, and rescissions of rules as actions in which it is appropriate
to consider the political influences behind an agency's decision. 67
Furthermore, she notes that some political influences are unacceptable as
support for an agency's decision. Specifically, she states:
Although drawing a precise line between permissible and
impermissible political influences is difficult, legitimate political
influences can roughly be thought of as those influences that seek to
further policy considerations or public values, whereas illegitimate
political influences can be thought of as those that seek to implement
raw politics or partisan politics unconnected in any way to the
69
statutory scheme being implemented.
In order to ensure that her proposal advances the accountability and
monitoring justifications for the political-control model, Professor Watts
66. Id. at 8-9.
67. Id. at 66. Professor Watts argues that these types of agency decisions are generally
based on policy considerations, such as priority setting and balancing of resources, rather than on
questions of science or technical expertise. Id. at 67-72. Accordingly, it is more appropriate for
the decisions to be made based on political factors. Id Professor Watts does not suggest that her
approach should be used, in general, when reviewing final rules promulgated by agencies;
however, she can foresee situations where an agency's final rule could appropriately be
influenced by political considerations, while not precluding the scientific and technical factors
that the agency is required to consider under the statute. Id. at 72-73. In those cases, she argues,
an agency could appropriately rely on political influences as a tiebreaker, and courts could accord
deference to the agency based on its consideration of those influences. Id. However, political
influences could not justify promulgating a rule inconsistent with the evidence or the statute. Id
68. See id. at 53-57.
69. Id at 9. At the extreme end of the spectrum, Professor Watts notes that it would be
inappropriate for an agency to indicate that the President directed the agency to take an action "to
reward the trial lawyers, who provided significant campaign support to the President," and that it
would be inappropriate for an agency to simply justify its action by stating that "'the President
made us do it."' Id at 54-55 (quoting Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a
Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 21 (2001)).
She recognizes, however, that her proposed standard for distinguishing appropriate influence
from inappropriate influence is "inherently fuzz[y]" and that her test might encourage agencies to
"spin ... partisan or raw political decisions as somehow being driven by public values or policy
choices." Id. at 56. Nevertheless, even when agencies "hide the ball," she reasons that agencies
will "at least ... be acknowledging some kinds . . . of political influences and . .. opening the
door for greater accountability and monitoring." Id. at 56-57. Further, she suggests that courts
could prevent agencies from hiding the ball by "smoking out undisclosed, extra-record political
influences, [and] . . . penalizing agencies for decisions that seem to be based upon undisclosed
political influences." Id. at 57.
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stresses that courts should only consider political influences as valid support
for an agency's decision when those influences are openly and transparently
disclosed in the agency's records.70 As noted previously, she suggests that
courts should consider political influences from the President, other executive-
branch officials, and Congress as valid support for an agenc I's decision, as
long as those influences are openly and transparently disclosed.
Although Professor Watts advocates that political influences justify an
agency's decision under the "hard look" arbitrary-and-capricious standard, she
recognizes that an agency cannot rely on political influences to justify a
72decision when a statute prohibits the agency from considering certain factors.
Political influence can only guide the agency's exercise of discretion within
those areas where it has discretion. However, Professor Watts argues that
statutes should be read to implicitly authorize agencies to consider political
influence as a decision-making factor, unless doing so would conflict with
other statutory limits on the agency's decision-making authority.73
Professor Watts suggests that the Supreme Court's recent ruling in FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc.74 could si nal that the Court is more open to
agencies relying on political influences. In that case, the Court upheld the
decision of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prosecute Fox
70. Id. at 44. The political influences could be disclosed, for instance, in "a notice of
proposed rulemaking, a statement of the basis and purpose accompanying a final rule, or a
statement explaining the denial of a rulemaking petition pursuant to section 555(e) of the
[Administrative Procedure Act]." Id.
71. Id at 57. Although Professor Watts advocates deference for agency decisions that are
influenced by Congress as well as the President, she recognizes that the political-control model is
more widely accepted as a presidential-control model rather than a political-control model, and
that it is difficult to determine when congressional influence would be an appropriate factor to
consider, because Congress, unlike the President, rarely speaks with one voice. Id. at 64-65.
72. Id. at 45-46.
73. Id. at 47-48. Professor Watts argues that, in general, when a statute does not explicitly
authorize an agency to consider certain factors in making a decision, courts might arrive at two
contradictory conclusions based on Congress's silence: Congress did not want the agency to
consider those factors, or Congress gave the agency discretion to consider those factors because it
did not prohibit consideration of those factors. Id. Supported by several opinions from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, she argues that Congress's silence regarding a factor
should be interpreted to allow the agency to consider that factor. Id & 47 n.208 (providing
examples of D.C. Circuit cases supporting her position). Accordingly, she deduces that courts
should not interpret Congress's silence regarding consideration of political influences to mean
that an agency cannot consider those influences. Id. at 47-48. Although she recognizes that the
Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), could be read to limit
an agency's authority to consider factors that are not explicitly identified in the statute the agency
is administering, she nonetheless maintains that the Court's more recent decision in Entergy
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009), clarified that an agency may consider political
factors in the face of congressional silence regarding those factors. See Watts, supra note 5, at
48.
74. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
75. See Watts, supra note 5, at 10- 11.
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Television for broadcasting "fleeting expletives," even though the agency was
changing its interpretation of "indecency" by prosecuting Fox.76 Writing for a
plurality of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia noted that the agency's decision
"77
was "spurred by significant political pressure from Congress". However, a
majority of the Court upheld the agency's new interpretation of the law, noting
that an agency's change in policy need not be subject to more stringent review
under the arbitrary-and-capricious test than an agency's initial adoption of a
policy. In describing the case, Professor Watts suggests that the Court's
decision "arguably makes it easier for agencies to change their policies due to
changes in the political wind." 79  Although the case involved political
influence from Congress, Professor Nina Mendelson suggests that the plurality
opinion could also justify agency reliance on presidential influence in decision
making.80
If courts are willing to consider political influences as valid support for
agency decisions under the "hard look" arbitrary-and-capricious analysis,
Professor Watts suggests that such a change will have several benefits. First,
she argues that the change would reduce the extent to which agencies subvert
science by making political decisions with manufactured technocratic
justifications.8 ' Under the current model, she notes, agencies have an incentive
to distort scientific facts to justify politically driven decisions. 82 If agencies
could openly disclose the political bases for their decisions, such distortions
would become unnecessary. As a second benefit, Watts argues that her
proposed change to the arbitrary-and-capricious standard would increase the
likelihood that courts would defer to agencies and thus reduce the ossification
of rulemaking.8 Agencies would be more likely to proceed with rulemaking,
and to proceed expeditiously, because they would have greater assurance that
their rules would be upheld.84  However, the primary benefit of Professor
Watts's proposal would be the increase in agency transparency and
accountability. Citing Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman, Professor Watts
stresses that "by requiring agencies to explain their decisions in a transparent
76. Fox Television, 129 S. Ct. at 1815-16.
77. Id. at 1816.
78. Id. at 1810-11.
79. Watts, supra note 5, at 10.
80. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1139.
81. See Watts, supra note 5, at 12 (discussing allegations that the George W. Bush White
House subverted scientific facts to further political goals).
82. Id at 40.
83. Id at 41-42.
84. Id Watts notes that unpredictable judicial review and the need to draft detailed
technical justifications for agencies' decisions have increasingly encouraged agencies to adopt
policies through means other than informal rulemaking. Id.
85. Id. at 13.
2011] I015
Catholic University Law Review
manner, political actors and their constituents gain access to information about
agency action and can monitor agencies."86
Professor Watts recognizes that it might be difficult to change the
application of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard in the manner that she
proposes because of a "first-mover" problem.87 Agencies may be reluctant to
rely on political factors when making decisions without first knowing whether
courts will uphold those decisions, and courts likewise may be reluctant to
signal a willingness to consider political influences if agencies have not
acknowledged their consideration of those factors in the past.88  Professor
Watts also notes that it might be necessary to balance the change in the
application of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard with penalties for agencies
that fail to disclose political influences. 89 Finally, Professor Watts recognizes
that courts may be uncomfortable with, or lack the expertise in, evaluating
political influences and the weight that they should be accorded in applying the
new standard. 90 Despite those challenges, Watts concludes that the benefits
weigh in favor of moving forward.91
86. Id at 42 (citing Bressman, supra note 55, at 1780). In her article, Professor Watts
outlines a litany of agency rules assertedly influenced by politics, and notes that not a single
agency disclosed any political influences in relation to those rules. See id at 23-29.
87. Id. at 13.
88. Id However, Professor Watts suggests that some courts have already begun to signal a
willingness to consider political factors. Id. at 75. She also suggests that a bold agency might
rely on political factors in a narrow case "where courts are more likely to see the value of political
judgments-such as denials of rulemaking petitions or withdrawals of proposed rules based upon
clearly articulated administration priorities." Id. at 74.
89. Id. at 13. Specifically, she suggests an affirmative requirement that agencies disclose
political influences. Id. at 76. This approach is advocated more forcefully by Professor Nina
Mendelson and is described in Part IV of this Article. Professor Watts recognizes the difficulty
that courts may have in determining when agencies are relying on, but not disclosing, political
influences. Watts, supra note 5, at 76.
90. Id at 80-81.
91. See id at 89. Professor Watts suggests that there may be many situations in which a
court need not determine the weight to give the political factors that an agency considers, but
merely needs to determine whether the agency acted rationally in considering those factors. See
id. at 82 (suggesting that when an agency declined to initiate or withdraw a discretionary
rulemaking based on presidential priorities and preferences regarding the allocation of resources,
the reviewing court would merely need to determine "that the agency's reliance on these priorities
in setting its own discretionary rulemaking agenda was rational"). Similarly, she argues that
when an agency chooses between "multiple factually supportable and statutorily permissible
options" based on political influence, a court would simply need to "assess as a factual matter
whether the agency was correct to claim that rational and legitimate political influences supported
the selection of one factually and legally permissible rule over another." Id The most difficult
cases for courts would arise when the agency, based on political influences, chooses an approach
that is not foreclosed by statute or scientific evidence, but an alternative approach is strongly
supported by the scientific evidence. Id. In those cases, Professor Watts suggests that courts
should consider the form and content of the political influence and more readily defer to political
influence that is provided "in a form designed to reinforce some of the positive attributes of
politics, such as accountability, public participation, and representativeness . . . ." Id. at 83.
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IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: MANDATORY DISCLOSURE OF POLITICAL
INFLUENCES
While Professor Watts proposes changing the application of the "hard look"
arbitrary-and-capricious analysis as a means of encouraging agencies to
disclose political influences in their decision making, Professor Nina
Mendelson advocates a more direct approach. She proposes a mandatory
requirement that agencies disclose presidential or executive influences on their
rulemaking decisions. 92  Professor Mendelson bases her proposal on the
assumption that it is entirely a propriate for the President to exert influence
over agency decision making. However, she stresses that her analysis of
agency rulemaking demonstrates that agencies rarely disclose such influence.94
Consequently, she argues, failure to disclose such influence decreases the
legitimacy of agencies' actions.95
Professor Mendelson suggests that the best way to implement her proposal
would be for Congress to enact new legislation that requires agencies to
prepare a publically accessible docket, containing written materials regarding
rules that the agency receives from the White House Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) or any other executive-branch officials and, with final
rules, a summary of its communications (written or oral) with the executive-
branch or other agencies, as well as the extent to which those communications
influenced the final rule.96 In the absence of legislation, Professor Mendelson
proposes, as a less effective alternative, an executive order that would impose
similar duties on agencies.9 7 In addition, she proposes that courts should defer
to agency decisions that are based on executive influence, regardless of the
92. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1130. Her focus includes both interpretive rules and
legislative rules, but does not include adjudication. Id.
93. See id. at 1130 (stating that undisclosed presidential influence is detrimental to the
legitimacy of an agency rule).
94. Id. at 1157. Similarly, the President and other White House officials also rarely
acknowledge their influence in rulemaking. Id. at 1148-49. Despite the silence, Professor
Mendelson asserts that her analysis of rulemaking data over the last few presidential
administrations also strongly suggests that presidents are exerting influence over agencies'
rulemaking decisions, but are not disclosing the influence. Id at 1154. Specifically, she points
out that although the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has reviewed
hundreds of rules promulgated during several administrations, and although a very high
percentage of those rules have been changed in light of OMB review, neither the agencies nor the
White House generally attribute the changes to presidential influence. Id. at 1148-57.
95. Id. at 1130.
96. Id. at 1164.
97. Id However, she recognizes that an executive order is less desirable because agencies
have previously ignored some of the disclosure requirements in existing executive orders. Id. at
1164-65. Executive orders generally are not enforceable in court. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron
and Preemption, 103 MICH. L. REV. 737, 786 (2007). As a final, but least favored alternative,
Professor Mendelson also suggests that agencies could "self-regulate and issue rules requiring
disclosure" of information about executive-branch influence in future agency actions.
Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1165.
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motivation for the influence, as long as the agency's decision comports with
the factors that the agency is authorized to consider by statute.9 8
Regardless of which form is implemented, Professor Mendelson asserts that
mandatory disclosure of presidential and other executive influences on agency
decision making has two main benefits. First, disclosing such information
would increase the legitimacy of an agency's decision, as the public would
"see the value-laden aspects of the decision as a reflection of presidential
preferences, rather than the decision of an unelected agency official." 99
Second, disclosing the information would reveal the President's true
involvement in the decision-making process, resulting in much more
transparency.100  The increased transparency should increase public
involvement in the decision-making process, thereby encouraging democratic
responsiveness and accountability in the agency.'0' The President would also
be more accountable as a result of the more transparent process.102
Additionally, Congress could then amend statutes if it felt that the President
were exerting too much or too little influence over the decision making.103
98. Id. at 1172. In this regard, her proposal differs significantly from Professor Watts's
proposal. Professor Mendelson's proposal would authorize a court to defer to an agency's
decision without regard for the form or content of the President's influence, as long as the
decision was within the discretion delegated to the agency. Id. But see supra note 91 (discussing
Professor Watts's proposal). Professor Mendelson distinguishes between policy issues and
technical issues in her proposal, noting that a court should not give increased deference to an
agency when it is improperly deciding a technical question by labeling it as a policy question, on
which a court should defer to executive influence. Id at 1173-74. Although she recognizes that
there is a risk that an agency might try to immunize technical issues from review by identifying
them as policy- or value-laden issues, she believes that the risk is minimal. Id. at 1174.
99. Id. at 1165.
100. Id. She argues that disclosure would clarify whether the President is encouraging
agencies to make decisions based on specific policies or values or is "simply second-guessing
expert decisions made within the agencies," and whether agencies are acting independently or
simply acquiescing to every direction from the President. Id. at 1165, 1177.
101. See id. at 1165-66.
102. Id. at 1166. Unlike the proposals to change the nature of the application of the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard, Professor Mendelson's proposal does not require courts to determine
whether a particular instance of presidential influence is appropriate or inappropriate. By alerting
the public of such influences, the disclosure of communications coming from the President or
close advisors, ranging "from an articulation of core values, . . . seeking the support of key
constituencies, . . . [or] simple political will," will prompt a consideration of the appropriateness
or inappropriateness of such influences. See id. at 1175, 1177. However, she maintains that
presidential pressure leading an agency to make a decision that was outside of its statutory
authority or irrational would likely be inappropriate. Id. at 1141. Specifically, she argues that
"presidential influence that is inconsistent with the agency's legal constraints; presidential
influence that prompts the agency to ignore its factual or technical conclusions; and influence that
is aimed at achieving some goal other than service to the public interest" would be "out of
bounds," as would political manipulation of scientific research and pressure that is unrelated to
"any notion of the public interest." Id. at 1141, 1143-44.
103. Id. at 1165. Although Professor Mendelson focuses on the possibility that Congress
could amend statutes to clarify the role that the President plays in overseeing agency decision
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Thus, in contrast to proposals that simply modify the application of the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard, Professor Mendelson asserts that the
mandatory requirement is superior because agencies are unlikely to disclose
presidential or political influence without a mandatory requirement, despite the
fact that disclosure might lead to increased deference. 0 4
Professor Mendelson acknowledges, but dismisses, claims that a mandatory
disclosure requirement could deter a full and open discussion of policies,'05
and that it could encourage the President to disengage from particular agency
proceedings.1os She also recognizes, but rejects, other concerns: that agencies
might comply with the letter of the law by including boilerplate statements in
rulemakin proceedings that fail to fully disclose the true nature of executive
influence; that agencies might not be candid about the true nature of
executive influence; os and that the President might exert influence through
channels that are not subject to mandatory disclosure under her proposal. 0
Finally, she realizes that the extensive discovery needed to unearth undisclosed
executive influence could disrupt agency decision making, and that her
proposal could be undermined if agencies assert executive privilege to prevent
disclosure of executive communications; however, she believes that the
discovery process could be streamlined to reduce the likelihood of those
problems.
making, Congress could act more directly by making more of the policy decisions itself in the
statute and reducing the amount of discretion that agencies have to make decisions based on
presidential influence.
104. Id. at 1165-66. In addition to the "first-mover" concerns previously discussed, she also
suggests that a President may wish to conceal information about his or her role in an agency's
decision making "to maintain 'deniability' and to avoid political risks," regardless of whether
disclosure of the influence would increase the likelihood that the agency's decision would be
upheld in court. Id. at 1166.
105. Id. However, because her proposal would not require disclosure of all conversations, but
would merely require a summary of communications, she argues that the proposal "would still
leave considerable room for private deliberations." Id. at 1167.
106. Id However, she feels that Presidents might be reluctant to disengage because the
public might negatively view their inaction as a "failure to oversee the agency." Id.
107. Id In response, though, she argues that the availability ofjudicial review and discovery
should reduce the likelihood that agencies will merely include boilerplate language to support
their decisions. Id.
108. Id at 1168. However, she suggests that even if disclosure is less than candid, it would
be an improvement over the status quo. Id.
109. Id. She rejects this position as unlikely and less than forcible. See id
110. Id at 1169-70. Although each of the criticisms that Professor Mendelson summarily
rejects could be explored and supported much more fully, this Article does not attempt to refine
those criticisms, focusing instead on different concerns, which Professor Mendelson did not
address.
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V. CRITIQUING THE MENDELSON AND WATTS PROPOSALS
Although the goal of increasing transparency in the rulemaking process is
admirable, the proposals to change the application of the arbitrary-and-
capricious standard and to require disclosure of presidential influences in
rulemaking could have unintended consequences, such as contributing to
further ossification of the rulemaking process, encouraging partisan judicial
decision making, and reducing consistency and certainty for regulated
communities and the public."' In addition, contrary to the predictions of its
supporters, changing the application of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard
might have little practical effect on the frequency of judicial approval of
agency rulemaking.112 Furthermore, there may be significant problems created
in implementing the proposals to change the application of the arbitrar 1-and-
capricious standard and to require disclosure of presidential influences."
At a more fundamental level, though, to the extent that the proposals suggest
that courts should accord agencies greater deference when the President
influences their decisions, the proposals are based on the adoption of the
presidential-control model and the rejection of an expertise model.114
Although the presidential-control model is clearly in vogue, strong arguments
can be made that the legitimacy of agenc action should not be measured by
responsiveness to the President's will. In addition, contrary to the
suggestion of some academics, it is not clear that the Supreme Court is any
more willing to accord deference to an agency's reliance on presidential
influence after the FCC v. Fox decision than the Court was when it decided
State Farm.116
A. Criticisms of the Presidential-Control Model
Proposals to increase deference for agency decisions that are influenced by
the President carry great weight when one begins with the proposition that it is
appropriate for the President to play a central role in directing or influencing
agencies' decision making. However, such proposals are less persuasive if one
rejects that premise. Professor Kevin Stack, one of the strongest critics of the
presidential-control model, bases his criticism on statutory, constitutional, and
policy grounds. 1 17
First, as a matter of statutory interpretation, Professor Stack challenges
Justice Kagan's claim that statutes that delegate discretionary authority to
executive-branch agencies implicitly delegate authority to the President to
111. See infra Parts V.F-H.
112. See infra Part V.E.
113. See infra Part V.D; see also supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 22-30.
115. See infra Part V.A.
116. See infra Part V.C.
117. See Stack, supra note 2 at 265-67.
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direct the agencies' exercise of discretion. 11 Professor Stack argues that
Congress has enacted statutes that explicitly delegate decision-making
authority to the President, as well as statutes that delegate decision-making
authority to agencies "with the approval of the President" or "under the
direction of the President."" In addition, within the same statute, Congress
occasionally has delegated authority to agencies under the direction of the
President in one section, but without limitation in another section.120 Professor
Stack argues that these choices by Congress are deliberate, just as the choices
to delegate decision-making authority to an independent agency as opposed to
an executive-branch agency. 121 Thus, Congress is experienced in delegatin
authority to the President to make decisions or direct decisions.2
Consequently, as a matter of statutory interpretation, when Congress delegates
decision-making authority to agencies without outlining a role for the
President, courts should not interpret the statutes as implicitly authorizing the
President to direct or control the agencies' decision making, even though the
delegation is to an executive-branch agency.123
As a constitutional matter, Professor Stack argues that the President's
constitutional power to remove executive-agency officials does not grant the
President the authority to direct executive agencies' decision making.124 On
the contrary, to the extent that the President can exert influence over agencies
by removing officials, it is less important that the President also have the
authority to direct the officials' decision making.125 Although there would be
political ramifications for a President's decision to remove an
18. Id. at 274-76.
119. Id. at 268, 276 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 610(c) (2000); Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 55 § 10, 4
Stat. 270, 274). Professor Stack refers to these statutes as "mixed agency-President delegations."
Id. at 268.
120. Id at285-87&285n.107.
121. Id at 290-91.
122. Id
123. Id at 285-89. By contrast, Professor Kagan argues that Congress intends that the
President direct agency decision making in all cases, but that Congress delegates authority to the
President explicitly in some cases, rather than to an agency, to give the President latitude to
decide which agency should ultimately exercise the authority. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2329.
Professor Stack argues, though, that Professor Kagan's statutory interpretation argument is fatally
flawed. Professor Kagan contends that "[o]nly if Congress sometimes stipulated that a delegation
of power to an agency official was subject to the ultimate control of the President-which
Congress has not, to my knowledge-would a claim of this kind (that is, a claim relying on the
negative implication of other statutes) succeed in defeating my argument." Id. at 2329-30. Stack
points out that Congress has done precisely that on several occasions, undercutting Professor
Kagan's argument. See Stack, supra note 2, at 287-89.
124. Stack, supra note 2, at 294-96.
125. See id. at 295 (arguing that the President is able to use his removal power to gain agency
support for his policies by firing a disagreeable department head and filling the vacancy with
someone more agreeable).
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executive-agency official, the President's constitutional power does not carry
with it an implied power to act in place of the official in lieu of removing that
official.126 In addition, Professor Stack argues that Congress assigns decision-
making authority in statutes based on an understanding that the President's
removal power does not carry with it a directive power.127 Apart from the
removal power, Professor Stack further asserts that the unitary-executive
theory, founded in Article II's delegation of executive power to the President,
does not compel the conclusion that congressional delegations to executive
agencies implicitly include directive authority for the President.12 8 If that were
the case, Stack argues, then statutes that delegate decision-making authority to
any official other than the President should be unconstitutional.129
Finally, Professor Stack suggests several policy reasons for not interpreting
statutes delegating decision-making authority to an executive-branch agency as
simultaneously delegating authority to the President to direct the agency's
decisions.'30 Specifically, he argues that delegating directive authority to the
President would remove the real decision-making process from the rulemaking
procedures required by law because the APA does not govern the President's
actions.131 According to Professor Stack, it does not make sense to infer
directive power for the President, thereby removing the decision-making
process from the APA's constraints, when the President can influence
agencies' decision making through the removal power and other controls that
the President has over agencies. Professor Stack also raises the concern that
inferring directive authority without limitation would arm the President with
too much power in comparison with Congress.1 33 He notes that the transaction
costs for the President in implementing policy are much lower than the costs of
congressional action and that the President has greater incentives to expand his
power than members of Congress have to restrict it.134 Further, he notes that it
is very difficult for Congress to overrule executive actions with which it
disagrees.' 35
126. Id. at 295. Professor Stack notes, though, that the assignment of the decision-making
authority to an agency alone, as opposed to the agency and the President, significantly impacts the
bargaining positions of the agency and the President. Id. at 295-96. He suggests that the
delegation of authority to an agency alone increases the chances that the agency will resist the
influence of the President. Id.
127. See id. at 296 (arguing that Congress delegates authority with the presumption that its
choice will affect the scope of the President's influence).
128. Id. at 266-67.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 318-21.
131. Id. at 318.
132. Id. at 318-19.
133. Id. at 319-20.
134. Id
135. Id. at 320-21.
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Other critics join Professor Stack in assailing the notion that agency decision
making should be directed or strongly influenced by the President. Notably,
supporters of the expertise model of administrative agencies are quick to point
out that agencies rely less on expertise, and their decisions are accordingly less
defensible, when they are guided by presidential direction and control instead
of expertise.136 Other critics of the presidential-control model complain that
the model does not account for the importance of congressional influence on
agency decision making.'3 7  Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman criticizes the
presidential-control model on entirely different grounds. Instead of focusing
on holding agencies accountable through the President or Congress, Professor
Bressman argues that "a focus on the avoidance of arbitrary agency
decisionmaking lies at the core of both a theoretical justification of
administrative legitimacy and a practical evaluation of administrative law
doctrines," and that the residential-control model is deficient because it does
not include such focus.'3
Professor Stack, Professor Bressman, and supporters of the expertise model
of administrative agencies attack the political-control model from different
angles. However, to the extent that they, and other critics of the
presidential-control model, discount the role of the President in directing or
controlling agency decision making, there is little reason for critics who agree
with their views to support increased judicial deference for agency decision
making based on presidential influence.
B. Silence and Relevant Factors
Another, but much weaker, criticism occasionally leveled at proposals to
increase deference for decisions based on presidential influence is that it is
improper for an agency to consider political influences in its decision making,
unless the authorizing statute explicitly allows the consideration of those
influences.' 39  If the statute is silent, then the agency's consideration of
political or presidential influences is not authorized by the statute, and the
agency's decision is therefore arbitrary and capricious.14
136. See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 54-55, 88 (discussing Massachusetts v.
EPA and State Farm as examples of the Supreme Court rejecting political influence); McGarity,
supra note 30, at 450; see also Watts, supra note 5, at 30 (discussing Justice Stephen Breyer's
support for an expertise model of agency decision making).
137. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 968
(1997).
138. Bressman, supra note 22, at 463-64. The misplaced focus of the
presidential-control model, she argues, "misleads us into thinking that accountability is all we
need to assure ourselves that agency action is constitutionally valid." Id.
139. See Watts, supra note 5, at 47 (discussing the two ways to interpret congressional
silence).
140. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 465 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
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As Professor Richard Pierce recounts, prior to 2007, it appeared that the
Supreme Court and lower courts allowed agencies to consider any factors
(political or otherwise) that were logically relevant to the question before the
agency, even though the statute that authorized the agency to resolve the
question did not explicitly list those factors for consideration.141 Agencies
could consider factors that were not explicitly listed in the statute, unless
Congress clearly limited the agency's discretion to consider those factors. 142
However, Professor Pierce suggests that a pair of Supreme Court decisions in
2007, Massachusetts v. EPA 3 and National Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Defenders of Wildlife,144 could be read to reclude the consideration of factors
not explicitly enumerated in a statute.' Professor Kathryn Watts raises
similar concerns about the Massachusetts v. EPA decision. 146  However, her
concerns are more targeted, as she suggests that the case could be read to limit
agencies' authority to consider presidential influences, as statutes rarely
explicitly authorize presidential influence. 47
In reviewing Massachusetts v. EPA, both Professor Pierce and Professor
Watts suggest that the Court's rejection of the Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) consideration of the President's ability to negotiate
international agreements regarding climate change and the President's desire to
implement a comprehensive climate-change strategy could be read as
signifying that the Court viewed the list of factors in the statute as an exclusive
list that the agency could consider in deciding whether to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions from mobile sources as an air pollutant under the Clean Air
Act.148  Similarly, in reviewing the Home Builders case, Professor Pierce
suggests that the Court's determination that the Department of Interior lacked
the authority to decline to transfer permitting authority to the State of Arizona
under the Clean Water Act, even if the Department concluded that the transfer
violated the Endangered Species Act, could also be read as limiting the
141. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can An Agency Consider in Making a
Decisions?, 2009 MIcH. ST. L. REv. 67, 67-68.
142. Id. at 73.
143. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
144. 551 U.S. 644 (2007).
145. Pierce, supra note 141, at 81-82.
146. See Watts, supra note 5, at 49-50.
147. Id.
148. See Pierce, supra note 141, at 78-82; Watts, supra note 5, at 48-49. Regarding the
majority's decision, Professor Pierce was troubled because
Congress was silent with respect to the factors the EPA can consider in deciding
whether to defer a judgment that greenhouse gas emissions from cars are a pollutant,
and all of the factors that the EPA considered are logically relevant to that decision.
Yet, the majority interpreted that congressional silence to prohibit the EPA from
considering any of those factors.
Pierce, supra note 141, at 78-79.
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agency's authority to consider factors not explicitly listed in the authorizing
statute. 149
Ultimately, Professor Pierce concludes that if the Massachusetts v. EPA and
Home Builders decisions limit agencies' authority to consider factors not
explicitly listed in statutes, they should be read narrowly to only apply to cases
in which the list of factors in the statute is preceded by mandatory language,
like "shall," as the statutes did in Massachusetts v. EPA and Home Builders. o
More cynically, Professor Pierce suggests that it is difficult to synthesize a
consistent rule from the two cases because the Court's reasoning, like the
agencies', may have been motivated by political factors. 151
However, it is not clear that the Massachusetts v. EPA or Home Builders
decisions departed in any meaningful way from the precedent identified by
Professor Pierce. Arguably, the Court did not prohibit an agency from
considering factors other than those identified in the statute in either case.152
Instead, the Court required the agency to justify its decision based on the
factors specifically listed in the statute. 15 3 Presumably, an agency can consider
factors not explicitly listed in the statute to the extent that they are relevant and
logically related to the factors listed in the statute. 154
For instance, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court reviewed a provision of the
Clean Air Act that requires the EPA to regulate air pollutants from mobile
sources in a particular manner if the agency, in its judgment, concludes that the
air pollutant "cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."' 55 When the Court struck
down the EPA's decision to not make an endangerment finding for carbon
dioxide due to certain political concerns, 156 the Court was not suggesting that
149. Id. at 80-82.
150. See id. at 82. Professor Pierce suggests that Congress's choice to use mandatory
language (e.g., shall), accompanied by a list of factors, could "properly" be read as "an implicit
congressional prohibition on consideration of any factor other than, or in addition to, the factors
set forth in the statutes." Id. at 82.
151. Id. at 86-87. Professor Pierce notes that the Massachusetts v. EPA and Home Builders
decisions should not be read as creating a new rule of statutory construction "that requires a court
to interpret congressional silence as a prohibition on agency consideration of a factor that is
logically relevant to a decision" because four of the Justices who voted in the majority in the
former case dissented in the latter. Id. This would mean "that nine Justices have adopted the
principle that congressional silence with respect to a logically relevant decisional factor must be
interpreted as a prohibition on agency consideration of that factor, while eight Justices have
adopted the opposite principle." Id. As a result, Professor Pierce suggests that the Justices'
voting patterns in the cases might have been influenced by political and ideological preferences,
rather than canons of statutory construction. Id. at 86-87.
152. See infra notes 157, 164-65 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 158-59, 165 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 157-58, 164-65, 173 and accompanying text.
155. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532-33 (2007) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)
(2006)) (alteration in the original).
156. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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the agency could not consider those factors because they were not listed in the
statute.157  Instead, the Court rejected those factors because they were not
relevant to the ultimate decision whether carbon dioxide causes or contributes
to air pollution, which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare or whether the agency should make such an "endangerment"
finding.158  Accordingly, it was not appropriate for the agency to base its
decision on factors other than those identified in the statute.
The Home Builders decision is more complicated because the Court viewed
the case as involving a conflict of statutes, rather than a case addressing
whether an agency could consider factors that are not explicitly listed in a
statute when making a decision under that statute.160 The case involved a
provision of the Clean Water Act requiring that the EPA approve the transfer
of water-pollution permitting authority to states if the nine requirements listed
in the statute were met.161 The respondents, Defenders of Wildlife, argued that
the EPA could not approve the transfer, however, if the transfer would
"jeopardize" an endangered species, thereby violating the Endangered Species
Act. 62 As the Supreme Court noted, Defenders of Wildlife conceded that the
nine transfer requirements in the Clean Water Act were met.'6 Accordingly,
the Court was not asked to determine whether the Department of Interior could
consider a factor that was not listed in the statute as a permissible basis for the
agency's decision making. Instead, the Court was asked to decide the more
limited question of whether the agency could consider an unlisted factor when
all of the listed factors had been satisfied.164 Thus, the Home Builders decision
should be viewed as a narrow statutory-interpretation decision, rather than a
precedent-setting decision resolving the scope of an agency's authority to
consider factors in the face of congressional silence.165
157. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533-34 (striking down the EPA's decision
because it did not offer a reasoned analysis supporting its decision).
158. Id. at 533-34. Thus, its decision was arbitrary or capricious. Id.
159. Id. at 532-33. Because the statute did not set forth any standards for the EPA to use in
deciding to make an endangerment finding, the dissent argued that it was wrong for the Court to
find that the factors justifying the agency's decision were not relevant to the standards for
decision in the statute. Id at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the agency
should be allowed to consider factors that "agencies regularly take into account" in the absence of
congressionally set standards, such as presidential priorities. Id.
160. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661-62 (2007).
161. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006); Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 649.
162. Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 669-71; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
163. Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 662.
164. See id at 661-62.
165. On the statutory-interpretation question, the Court noted that the repeal of a statute by
implication is disfavored and that specific statutes control over more general statutes, implying
that the Endangered Species Act should not be read as modifying the mandatory requirements of
section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act. Id at 662-64. The Departments of Interior and
Commerce, which were charged with implementing the Endangered Species Act, had
promulgated regulations that resolved the conflict between section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered
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If there were any question about whether the Massachusetts v. EPA and
Home Builders decisions significantly limited agencies' authority to consider
factors not explicitly listed in a statute, it was resolved, as Professor Pierce
ultimately notes,166 in the Supreme Court's decision in Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper.167 In that case, a majority of the Court determined that the EPA
could consider the cost of technological alternatives in setting a pollution-
control standard under the Clean Water Act, based on the language requiring
the "best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact,"168  even though the statute did not explicitly authorize the
consideration of costs.' The Court stressed that this language was broad
enough to allow for the consideration of costs and upheld the agency's
decision, regardless of the existence of several other provisions in the Clean
Water Act that explicitly authorized consideration of costs,170 from which the
Court could have inferred that Congress's failure to explicitly authorize
consideration of costs in the disputed section indicated Congress's intent to
foreclose the consideration of costs.17 1
Directly addressing the argument that the statute should be read as
prohibiting any consideration of cost, because Congress did not explicitly
identify cost as a factor, the majority wrote:
The inference that respondents and the dissent would draw from the
silence is, in any event, implausible, as § 1326(b) is silent not only
with respect to cost-benefit analysis but with respect to all potentially
relevant factors. If silence here implies prohibition, then the EPA
could not consider any factors in implementing § 1326(b)-an
obvious logical impossibility. It is eminently reasonable to conclude
that § 1326(b)'s silence is meant to convey nothing more than a
refusal to tie the agency's hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis
should be used, and if so to what degree.172
Species Act and other laws by providing that the requirements of section 7(a)(2) applied to
"discretionary" agency actions, but not to mandatory actions, like EPA's duties under section
402(b) of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 665. The Court ultimately concluded, under the Chevron
analysis, that the agencies' resolution of the conflicting statutory directives was reasonable. Id. at
666-67.
166. See Pierce, supra note 141, at 88.
167. 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
168. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
169. Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1506-08.
170. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(l)-(4), 1316(b)(1)(B).
171. Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1507-08.
172. Id at 1508. The Court did not believe that its decision conflicted with its prior decision
in Whitman v. American Trucking Assn's, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Id The majority wrote that
"American Trucking thus stands for the rather unremarkable proposition that sometimes statutory
silence, when viewed in context, is best interpreted as limiting agency discretion. For the reasons
discussed earlier, § 1326(b)'s silence cannot bear that interpretation." Id. The Court also
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After Entergy, it seems clear, once again, that agencies should be able to
consider factors that are not explicitly listed in statutes, as long as they are
relevant to the factors and standards set forth in the statute as the basis for
agency decision making. 173 Similarly, agencies should be able to consider
political influences and factors as long as they are relevant to the statutory
factors and standards. It is also clear, though, that after Massachusetts v. EPA,
agencies cannot rely on political influences and factors to justify a decision
when those considerations disregard the factors or standards set forth in a
statute.' 74
C. Misreading FCC v. Fox
Though the Massachusetts v. EPA and Home Builders decisions should not
be read as limiting the authority of agencies to consider a variety of factors in
decision making when Congress is silent, neither those cases, nor FCC v. Fox,
should be read to suggest that the Supreme Court is broadening its acceptance
of agencies' consideration of political factors. To the extent that the Supreme
Court remains skeptical of agencies' consideration of political factors, it is
unlikely that courts will embrace the proposals to modify the application of the
arbitrary-and-capricious standard to increase deference for agencies' decision
making based on political factors.' 75
As noted, Professors Watts and Mendelson both suggest that the Fox
decision could signal the Court's shift toward greater openness regarding the
consideration of political factors.176 It is also true that a plurality of the Fox
Court approved the FCC's consideration of political factors when the agency
changed its policy regarding fleeting expletives. 77  Upholding the agency's
new policy, the plurality wrote that "[i]f the F.C.C. is indeed an agent of
distinguished its prior decision in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490 (1981). Describing that case, the Court wrote,
In American Textile, the Court relied in part on a statute's failure to mention cost-
benefit analysis in holding that the relevant agency was not required to engage in cost-
benefit analysis in setting certain health and safety standards. But under Chevron, that
an agency is not required to do so does not mean that an agency is not permitted to do
SO.
Id. (citations omitted).
173. Even the dissenting Justices in Entergy conceded that a statute's silence should not
always be read as prohibiting consideration of factors that mentioned in the statute. See id. at
1517 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When interpreting statutory silence in the past, we have sought
guidance from a statute's other provisions."). Thus, for the dissent, context was key.
174. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part III.
176. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
177. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1816 & n.4 (2009) (plurality
opinion).
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Congress, it would seem an adequate explanation of its change in position that
Congress made clear its wishes for stricter enforcement."178
However, five Justices appeared to oppose the agency's decision to justify a
change in position based on political factors. Justice Breyer, for example,
wrote "[t]hat law grants those in charge of independent agencies broad
authority to determine relevant policy. But it does not permit them to make
policy choices for purely political reasons nor to rest them primarily upon
unexplained policy preferences."' In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens
argued that the FCC's regulations "are not subject to change at the President's
will."' 80 Most importantly, although Justice Kennedy joined with most of the
plurality opinion, he refused to join with the portion of the opinion suggestin
that the FCC could base its change in position on political influence.
Instead, he wrote a concurring opinion that seemingly affirmed State Farm's
requirement that agencies must justify their changes in policy with technical
reasons based upon the requirements laid out in the statute, rather than political
influences. 82
Even if Justice Kennedy had joined with the plurality in its conditional
support of the FCC's reliance on political factors to support its decision
making, the Court's opinion would not necessarily support the position,
advanced by Professors Mendelson and Watts, that executive agencies can
justify their decision making by relying, in part, on presidential influence.183
To the extent that the plurality in Fox suggested that it was appropriate for the
FCC to rely on congressional influence in changing its policy regarding
fleeting expletives, it did so based on the assumption that the FCC was an
"agent of Congress," rather than an executive agency, which was an
assumption that the plurality viewed skeptically.184 Thus, the plurality did not
express any view regarding whether it is appropriate for executive agencies to
rely on presidential influence to support their decision making.
Instead of increasing authority for agencies to consider political factors in
decision making, it is arguable that, if agencies can consider political
influences during decision making at all, the Fox decision could make it more
178. Id at 1816. The plurality suggests that Congress uses its oversight and appropriations
powers to control executive agencies. Id at n.5.
179. Id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer further wrote, "[w]here does, and
why would, the APA grant agencies the freedom to change major policies on the basis of nothing
more than political considerations or even personal whim?" Id, at 1832.
180. Id. at 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182. See id. at 1823-24. He concurred, rather than dissented, because he determined that the
FCC adequately explained its change in position on grounds other than political considerations.
Id. at 1824.
183. See infra Parts III-IV.
184. Fox, 129 S. Ct. at 1816 (plurality opinion). The plurality's skepticism toward viewing
the FCC as an "agent of Congress" was based on "the unconstitutionality of a scheme giving the
power to enforce laws to agents of Congress." Id.
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difficult for agencies to rely on political influences to justify a change in policy
than to rely on political influences when initially establishing a policy. The
major focus of the Fox case, after all, was on whether agencies are held to a
different standard when changing a policy than when initially adopting a
policy, not on whether it was appropriate for agencies to consider political
influences to justify the change.' On that primary question, Justice Breyer, in
his dissenting opinion, argued that when an agency changes a policy that it
previously adopted, it has an obligation to "focus on the reasons that led the
agency to adopt the initial policy" and explain why it is now interpreting the
law differently, without simply relying on political influences.1 8 6
Justice Stevens's dissent went further. He argued that, in the interest of
regulatory stability, there should be a strong presumption in favor of an
agency's initial policy interpretations and that an agency must "justif why its
prior policy is no longer sound before allowing it to change course."1 On this
question, Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, wrote:
This separate writing is to underscore certain background principles
for the conclusion that an agency's decision to change course may be
arbitrary and capricious if the agency sets a new course that reverses
an earlier determination but does not provide a reasoned explanation
for doing so. In these circumstances, I agree with the dissenting
opinion of Justice Breyer that the agency must explain why "it now
reject[s] the considerations that led it to adopt that initial policy." . . .
The question whether a change in policy requires an agency to
provide a more-reasoned explanation than when the original policy
was first announced is not susceptible, in my view, to an answer that
applies in all cases. . . . The question in each case is whether the
agency's reason for the change, when viewed in light of the data
available to it, and when informed by the experience and expertise of
the agency, suffice to demonstrate that the new policy rests upon
principles that are rational, neutral, and in accord with the agency's
proper understanding of its authority.18 8
185. See id. at 1810. A five member majority of the Court determined that there was "no
basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency
change be subjected to more searching review." Id
186. Id. at 1829-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer would require "the agency to
answer the question, 'Why did you change?' And a rational answer to this question typically
requires a more complete explanation than would prove satisfactory were change itself not an
issue." Id. at 1830. He stressed that he was not requiring a heightened standard of review, but
rather "application of the same standard of review to different circumstances, namely
circumstances characterized by the fact that the change is at issue." Id. at 183 1.
187. Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Kennedy's opinion,
therefore, leaves open the possibility that in some cases, it may be more difficult for an agency to
justify a change in a policy than the initial adoption of that policy.
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Five Justices, therefore, wrote or joined in opinions that could, as a practical
matter, make it more difficult for agencies to change policies, for political
reasons or otherwise, than to adopt policies initially.
Thus, it seems dubious to read Fox as inaugurating increased Supreme Court
approval for consideration of political factors by agencies in decision making.
Although Fox might not signal a change in the Court's position, it remains to
be seen whether Justice Kagan's ascension to the Court will spark that change.
As previously noted, Justice Kagan has advocated greater judicial deference
for agency decisions based on presidential influence.189 She is replacing
Justice Stevens, who was one of the dissenting Justices in Fox, so it is possible
that, in the right case, she could provide the fifth vote in favor of expanding
agencies' consideration of political, or at least presidential, influences.
D. More Deference? How Much More?
Putting aside concerns regarding challenges to the political-control model of
administrative law and skepticism regarding whether the Supreme Court favors
increased consideration of political influences, there are several other concerns
that need to be addressed regarding the proposals to change the application of
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard and to require disclosure of presidential
influences. Perhaps the most difficult issues that would arise in implementing
Professor Watts's proposal to accord greater deference to politically motivated
decisions by agencies involve determining which political factors an agency
can consider, and how to weigh those factors against other criteria that an
agency is required to consider by law.
Professor Watts proposes that agencies should be allowed to justify their
decisions based on political influences that seek to further policy goals or
public values, but not based on political influences that seek to implement raw
partisan politics unconnected to the statutory scheme being implemented. 190
Although it may be easy to discern the legitimacy of political influences at
their extremes, there is a vast grey area in between consisting of influences that
will not fall easily into either of her categories. It also may be difficult for
courts to enforce her proposal without clear guidance on where to draw the line
separating appropriate political influences from inappropriate ones. More
importantly, Professor Watts acknowledges that her proposal would provide
agencies with the incentive to identify "appropriate" political influences for
their decisions, while failing to disclose any inappropriate political
influences.191
Her proposal is also difficult to implement because she does not clarify how
much weight a court should give the political influences that the agency
considers, other than to suggest that the influences are additional justifications
189. See supra note 58.
190. See supra note 69.
191. See Watts, supra note 5, at 56-60, 76.
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for an agency's decision.' 9 2 Presumably, they would not take precedence over
factors that an agency is required to consider by statute. If political influences
do not take precedence over those factors, though, the agency has little
incentive to disclose the influences unless they are consistent with the factors
that the agency is required to consider.193
Perhaps the influences might be viewed as a "thumb on the scales" or a "tie
breaker" in favor of a position supported by the President or Congress, if all
other factors are equal and the agency is choosing between two approaches that
are each consistent with the statutory factors, 9 4 which is unlikely to be a
frequent set of circumstances. If, on the other hand, the influences are simply
one more factor to consider and have no greater weight than any other factor, it
is not clear that consideration of political influences would result in a
significant increase in the amount of deference that courts accord to agencies
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.195 Professor Watts's proposal is
also difficult to implement because she suggests that political influences can
help justify an agency's decision, but she does not provide any guidance
regarding how a court should weigh competing political influences, such as
when the President and Congress disagree, or how to clearly identify what
constitutes political influence from Congress.196
Professor Mendelson recognized these implementation difficulties in
Professor Watts's proposal, which is why she restricted her proposal to
sweeping presidential influences, rather than "political influences," limited
only by the authorizing statute and hard science. Although her proposal also
192. See id at 67-72 (arguing that political influence should play a "role" in judicial
deliberations).
193. See supra Part V.B (discussing judicial treatment requiring that outside considerations
be relevant to the statutory factors).
194. See Watts, supra note 5, at 82. Perhaps that is what Professor Watts is suggesting when
she argues that when an agency chooses between "multiple factually supportable and statutorily
permissible options" based on political influence, a court would simply need to "assess as a
factual matter whether the agency was correct to claim that rational and legitimate political
influences supported the selection of one factually and legally permissible rule over another." See
id. However, her proposal might call for even greater weight for political influences. See id. at
83.
195. See Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1173 (stating that presidential influence is just one
factor that courts would review, and it would not preclude effective review); see also Part V.E
(discussing how consideration of political influences would have little practical effect on
deference).
196. See id. at 63-65 (discussing potential conflicting influences between Congress,
congressional committees, congressmen, and the President).
197. See Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1172-77. However, her proposal still suffers, to some
extent, from problems similar to Professor Watts's proposal, due to the arguments she makes in
support of her position. See supra notes 98, 102 (discussing her arguments). When Mendelson
identifies some influences as "out of bounds," her proposal requires courts to draw lines without a
significant bright line, in a situation in which agencies have an incentive to "hide the ball"
regarding their true justifications, just as with Professor Watts's proposal. See supra text
accompanying note 195.
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encourages agencies to frame the rationales for their decisions in terms of the
statutory factors and to disclose presidential influence selectively (that is, only
if it supports a decision consistent with the statutory factors), the heart of her
proposal is a mandatory requirement for disclosure of presidential influences,
intended to counteract selective reporting by agencies.198 Nevertheless, she
acknowledges that agencies might find ways to avoid the mandatory disclosure
requirement for influences that are not consistent with the statutory
requirements.199 Ultimately, both Professor Mendelson's proposal and
Professor Watts's proposals could be criticized as leaving courts with the
difficult task of drawing lines without firm guidance.
E. More Deference? Maybe Not
Even if courts are able to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate
influences on agency decision making and are thereby able to weigh those
influences, it is not clear that considering those influences under the arbitrary-
and-capricious standard will result in greater deference for agencies. Without
increased deference, there is little added incentive for agencies to disclose the
political or presidential influences on their decision making. 200
As previously noted, Professor Watts, and to some degree Professor
Mendelson, argue that courts should be allowed to consider political
influences, including presidential influences, as support for an agency's
decision when reviewing the decision under the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard. 201 Both assume that courts will defer more frequently to agencies
when applying the modified standard.2 02  However, Professor David Zaring
argues that, in practice, there is very little variance in the deference that courts
accord to agencies, regardless of the standard the courts purport to apply when
203reviewing agencies' decisions.
Professor Zaring acknowledges that courts claim to be applying six different
standards when reviewing agency decisions, based on whether the court is
reviewing a question of fact, law, or arbitrariness, whether the agency
procedures were formal or informal, and whether judicial deference is required,
as with the Chevron test.204 However, by comparing empirical studies
documenting the rate at which agency decisions were upheld under each of the
different standards, Professor Zaring concludes that courts reach similar results
under each of the standards, reversing agencies slightly less than one-third of
198. See Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1164-65.
199. Id. at 1168.
200. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (describing the first-mover dilemma).
201. See supra notes 62-66, 98 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 201.
203. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REv. 135, 137 (2010).
204. Id. at 136-37, 143. Professor Zaring also notes that courts claim that the choice of the
standard to be applied can affect, in a practical way, the outcome of the case. Id. at 137.
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the time.205 Ultimately, Professor Zaring posits that courts use a
reasonableness test in applying each of the standards, notwithstanding the label
206
given to the standard employed. Consequently, he advocates a single
"reasonableness" standard, which would apply to judicial review of agency
action regardless of whether the case involves questions of law or fact,
involves formal or informal procedures, focuses on whether the agency acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, or involves the Chevron analysis.207 This
"reasonableness" test would replace the "hard look," ''substantial evidence,"
"arbitrary and capricious," Chevron, Skidmore, and de novo standards
currently used by courts to review agency actions.208
If Professor Zaring is correct, then even if the arbitrary-and-capricious
standard is modified to include presidential or political influences as part of its
analysis, courts will be unlikely to affirm agencies' decisions at a greater rate
than under the unmodified arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The results will
be the same regardless of how the standard is framed. If the decisions of
agencies are not affirmed more frequently under a modified arbitrary-and-
capricious standard, agencies will not have an incentive to disclose the
presidential or political influences on their decision making.
However, reasonable minds could differ regarding the conclusions that
Professor Zaring draws from his comparison of the empirical studies
examining the rates at which agency decisions were affirmed under the various
standards.209 Although he concludes that courts affirm agency decisions at
roughly the same rate regardless of which standard is being used, the data that
he reviews are a bit more equivocal. For instance, the actual rates at which
courts affirmed agency decisions in the twelve studies that he reviewed ranged
205. Id. at 137, 169-78. Based on twelve empirical studies and his own study, Professor
Zaring concludes that judges defer to agency action between sixty to seventy percent of the time,
irrespective of the type of review employed by the court. Id. at 169. He further concludes, from
the data, that "unless there is some reason to believe that these very similar validation rates mask
very different sorts of inquiries, what courts are really doing is the same sort of analysis
regardless of the standard of review." Id. (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 165-68. Given that the six standards are actually one, Professor Zaring counsels
that "the rules governing judicial review have no more substance at the core than a seedless
grape." Id. at 138 (quoting Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative
Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 780 (1975)).
207. Zaring, supra note 203, at 138-39. Zaring argues that the proliferation of a variety of
standards requires courts to expend energy categorizing agency decisions as specific types to
determine the appropriate standard of review, and distracts courts from the underlying
"reasonableness" review that they ultimately carry out under each of the standards. See id. at
137-38 (describing the confusion judges encounter when attempting to decide which standard
applies in a particular case).
208. Id. at 136-37.
209. See generally id at 169-76 (discussing prior scholarship on the subject).
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from fifty-four percent to seventy-seven percent.210 Although the average rate
of affirmance under all of the studies was sixty-nine percent, the rates in the
three studies that examined the largest number of decisions were fifty-eight
percent, seventy-six percent, and seventy-seven percent.211 Contrary to
Professor Zaring's conclusions, the rate at which agencies' decisions are
affirmed might actually vary depending on the standard that is applied. If the
standards are applied differently in practice, after all, then Professors Watts
and Mendelson may be correct to presume that changing the manner in which
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is applied might actually result in greater
deference for agencies' decisions, which would prompt greater disclosure of
presidential and political influences. 2 12
F. Ossification
Regardless of whether Professor Zaring's cynicism is justified or not, the
proposals of Professor Watts and Professor Mendelson may create other
problems. For instance, Professor Watts suggests that her proposal might
decrease the ossification of agency rulemaking by encouraging agencies to
make rules because they would be accorded greater deference. However,
her proposal and Professor Mendelson's proposal could have precisely the
opposite effect. To the extent that additional mandatory procedures for
disclosure of presidential influence on agencies would be required under
214Professor Mendelson's proposal, and to the extent that agencies would be
required to disclose the nature and content of political influences to eam
deference under Professor Watts's proposal, both proposals could increase,
rather than decrease, the ossification of agency rulemaking by increasing the
procedural requirements necessary.
For more than a decade, academics and policymakers have suggested that
agencies are beginning to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking in response to
the increased likelihood of consequent litigation challenging the new rules,216
as well as the ossification of the process resulting from the burdensome
procedural requirements imposed by courts, Congress, and the executive
210. Id at 171 tbl.1. Professor Zaring dismisses the study that found an affirmance rate of
fifty-four percent as an outlier because the study focused on cases decided in the D.C. Circuit at a
time "when liberal judges roared." Id. at 170.
211. Id. at l71 tbl.l.
212. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
213. See Watts, supra note 5, at 41-42.
214. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
216. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1296 (1997); PHILIP K. HOWARD: THE DEATH OF
COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA 87 (1994); JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY Do IT 284 (1989).
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217branch. The rulemaking process, from the publication of the notice of
proposed rulemaking until the publication of a final rule, generally takes three
to five years. 218
Many factors are blamed for the "ossification" of notice-and-comment
rulemaking, including the judicial interpretation of the rulemaking provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act,21 the procedural requirements imposed
by the Regulatory Flexibility Act,220 the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act,221 and similar laws,222 as well as the review
procedures imposed by the executive branch through Executive Order
12,866223 and a variety of other executive orders addressing takings,224
federalism,225 and children's health,2 26 among other topics.227
217. Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification's Demise: An Empirical Analysis ofEPA Rulemaking
from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 768 (2008) [hereinafter, Johnson, Ossification's Demise]; see
JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 9-25 (1990); Stephen
M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief 72 Mo. L. REV. 695, 695-97 (2007); Stephen M.
Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to
Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 278 (1998); Stephen M.
Johnson, Ruminations on Dissemination: Limits on Administrative and Judicial Review under the
Information Quality Act, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 159-67 (2005); Thomas 0. McGarity, The
Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV.
525, 541-49 (1997) [hereinafter McGarity, Response]; Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 passim (1992) [hereinafter McGarity,
Some Thoughts]; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN.
L. REV. 59, 60-62 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce, Seven Ways]; Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review ofNotice and Comment
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 passim (1997).
218. McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 217, at 1387-90 & tbl.1; see also Cornelius M.
Kerwin & Scott Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of Theory, 2 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 113, 124 (1992) ("For almost all program offices, the amount of time from
proposal to final is just about the same . . . ."). But see Johnson, Ossification's Demise, supra
note 217, at 784 (finding that rules finalized by EPA between 2001 and 2005 were finalized, on
average, within one and a half to two years after being published as proposed rules).
219. See Pierce, Seven Ways, supra note 217, at 65-66.
220. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2006).
221. Small Business Regulatory Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, title tl, 110 Stat
847, 857-74 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5 and 15).
222. See Johnson, Ossification's Demise, supra note 217, at 774-75 (discussing the
Information Quality Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and
the Congressional Review Act).
223. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (2006) (requiring OMB review).
224. E.g., Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(requiring agencies to evaluate the effect that their actions would have on individuals' Fifth
Amendment rights).
225. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1999), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(requiring agencies to evaluate the effect that their actions would have on principles of
federalism).
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In light of the "ossification" of rulemaking, coupled with the frequency of
challenges to rules, academics have noted that agencies are increasingly
228reluctant to change existing rules or to issue new rules. Instead, agencies are
relying more frequently on adjudication and informal tools, such as uidance
documents, policy statements, and interpretive rules to interpret laws. When
agencies rely on these informal tools, it reduces opportunities for the public to
participate in the development of policies and makes it more difficult for the
regulated community to locate the law, to comply with the law, or to challenge
the policies adopted by agencies.230
Professor Mendelson's proposal aspires to increase the transparency of
notice-and-comment rulemaking by requiring agencies to prepare a docket for
each rule that includes all written communications from executive-branch
officials; by requiring agencies to prepare written summaries of oral
communications between executive-branch officials, other agencies, and the
agency regarding the rulemaking; and describing the extent to which those
communications influenced the final rule.231 Compliance with these new
procedures would likely slow the rulemaking process simply because these
procedures require more record keeping and disclosure. More significantly, to
the extent that failure to comply with these new procedures, or to adequately
explain the basis for a rule in light of the additional information that must be
disclosed, creates additional avenues to challenge an agency's decision,
litigation-averse agencies would have additional incentives to avoid notice-
and-comment rulemaking. Thus, Professor Mendelson's proposal has the
potential to exacerbate the current "ossification" trend.
Although Professor Watts's proposal does not require agencies to disclose
presidential or political influence, it does encourage disclosure to receive
greater deference for the decisions made in reliance on that influence.232 As
with Professor Mendelson's proposal, disclosure of additional information
would, by necessity, require additional record keeping and would likely slow
the rulemaking process. If courts were to accord more deference to an
agency's decision because the agency disclosed information about political
233influences, as Watts and Mendelson propose, 2 both proposals might reduce
the incentive of agencies to avoid rulemaking due to fear of litigation. If,
226. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,045, 3 C.F.R. 198 (1997), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 note
(2006) (requiring agencies to evaluate the environmental and health risks that a rule may impose
on children).
227. Johnson, Ossification's Demise, supra note 217, at 777 n.77.
228. McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 217, at 1390-92.
229. Johnson, Ossification's Demise, supra note 217, at 778.
230. Id. at 778-79.
231. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
232. See Watts, supra note 5, at 41-42 (arguing that increased deference based upon political
influence would decrease ossification).
233. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1171-72; Watts, supra note 5, at 41-42.
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however, Professor Zaring is correct in his assertion that courts are likely to
affirm or reverse agency decisions at roughly the same rate regardless of the
standard of review,234 then Professor Watts's proposal could slow the
rulemaking process down without providing agencies any additional benefit.
Ultimately, both proposals could hamper the rulemaking process by
requiring additional procedures without decreasing, and possibly increasing,
the potential for litigation. To that extent, the proposals seem to provide
further incentives for agencies to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Although the goal of the proposals is increased disclosure of the reasons for
policies and rules adopted by agencies, the outcome could be decreased access
to the policies and laws themselves.
G. Partisan Judging
Although increasing the transparency of agencies' decision making by
requiring disclosure of the presidential and political influences has many
benefits, it may have one unfortunate and unintended negative consequence as
well. Several recent studies have suggested that judges often decide cases
based on partisan political preferences. 235  To the extent that the reform
proposals of Professors Watts and Mendelson increase the exposure of the
political influence behind an agency's decision, they also increase the
opportunity for judges to determine whether to uphold the agency's decision
based on their own political preferences.
Professors Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein, among others, suggest that
judges, including Supreme Court Justices, frequently appear to be motivated
by political ideology. 23 6 Professors Miles and Sunstein reviewed decisions of
the Supreme Court and federal appellate judges in cases applying the Chevron
standard to determine whether application of the standard reduced judicial
policymaking. 237 In theory, the standard should create a uniform rate at which
judges approve agency decisions that do not correlate to the ideology of the
judges.
234. Zaring, supra note 203, at 169-70.
235. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the US Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 59 (1998); Thomas J. Miles &
Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 825-26 (2006); see also Scott Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REv. 419, 422 (2009) (stating that the current state of judicial
review of agency rulemaking gives judges too much freedom to decide according to partisan
preferences).
236. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 235, at 825-26.
237. Id. at 825.
238. Id. at 827-28. Under the two-part Chevron test, if a statute is ambiguous, it is the
agency, rather than the court, that is charged with making policy, and the court should defer to the
agency's interpretation as long as it is reasonable. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1983).
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However, in reviewing the opinions of Supreme Court Justices, Miles and
Sunstein determined that the validation rates for Justices varied by almost
thirty percent among the Justices.239 More important than the simple variation
in approval rates, though, Miles and Sunstein concluded that political ideology
played an important role in the Justices' decision making: (1) "liberal" Justices
voted to validate agency decisions more often than "conservative" Justices in
general; (2) the rate at which the Justices validated agency decisions seemed to
be significantly influenced by whether the agency interpretation was "liberal"
or "conservative;" and (3) the rate at which the Justices validated agency
decisions seemed to be significantly influenced by the political party of the
administration whose decisions were being reviewed.240 Miles and Sunstein
concluded that "the most conservative members of the Supreme Court show
significantly increased validation of agency interpretations after President
Bush succeeded President Clinton." 241
In a study of Chevron decisions of the federal appellate courts in 1995 and
1996, Professor Orin Kerr also found evidence that judges were influenced by
political ideology.242  Professor Kerr reviewed two hundred cases decided
during that time period and found that: (1) in cases involving denial of
entitlement benefits, republican judges upheld denials one hundred percent of
the time, while democratic judges upheld the denials only forty percent of the
time; (2) in immigration appeals, republican judges supported the government
against the individual in seventy-one percent of the cases, while democratic
judges only supported the government in forty-two percent of the cases; and
(3) in cases involving commerce, trade, and taxes, in which deferring to the
government would further "liberal" policies, democratic judges upheld
agencies' actions in ninety-two percent of the cases, while republican judges
243
upheld agencies' actions in only sixty-eight percent of the cases. Based on
those findings, Kerr concluded that there was a tendency for republican and
239. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 235, at 831. Justice Breyer voted to uphold agency
decisions in almost eighty-two percent of the Chevron cases in the study, while Justice Thomas
voted to uphold agency decisions in only about fifty-two percent of the cases. Id In a recent
article, I found a similar divergence in a review of Chevron decisions issued by the Roberts
Court. See Stephen M. Johnson, The Roberts Court and the Environment, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 317, app. B at 356-59 (2010). Of the environmental law cases decided by the Roberts
Court using the Chevron analysis, Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens only voted to uphold
the agencies' decisions in one of five cases, while Justices Alito, Scalia, Roberts, and Thomas
voted to uphold the agencies' decisions in four of five cases. Id.
240. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 235, at 823.
241. Id. Though they also noted that "liberal" Justices voted to validate agency decisions less
frequently when they reviewed decisions of a republican administration than a democratic
administration, the disparity in validation rates was much less dramatic than in validation rates for
the most "conservative" Justices. Id. at 826.
242. See Kerr, supra note 235, at 1, 59.
243. Id. at 38-39.
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democratic judges to reach results consistent with their political ideologies, at
least in cases with clear political divisions.244
Not all commentators agree that judges are increasingly deciding cases
based on political ideology, though. For instance, in a 1997 study of two
hundred and fifty environmental decisions in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, Professor Richard Revesz found no statistically significant
difference in the aplication of Chevron to those cases by republican or
democratic judges. Similarly, Professor David Zaring reviewed federal
appellate court decisions applying the substantial-evidence test, which applies
to agency fact-finding in formal proceedings, and concluded that republican-
appointed judges voted to uphold the agency's findings seventy percent of the
time, while democratic-appointed udges voted to uphold the agency's findings
seventy-two percent of the time.
If, however, skeptics are correct that judges are increasingly deciding cases
based on political ideologies, disclosure of the President's influence on an
agency during the rulemaking process, as the proposals of Professors Watts
and Mendelson would require, could increase the number of cases decided
along partisan lines. In many cases, the President's position on a policy or a
rule may be clear even without the imposition of additional disclosure
requirements.247 In those cases, judges who are predisposed to decide a case
based on political ideology will do so, regardless of whether Professors
Watts's or Mendelson's proposals are implemented. However, it is likely that
Professors Watts's and Mendelson's proposals, if implemented, will expose the
President's position on policies and rules where the President's position would
not otherwise be obvious and will expose the extent to which the President was
involved in the agencies' decision making. Indeed, those are precisely the
244. Id. at 39-40.
245. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C Circuit, 83
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1747-48 (1997); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron Should Not Be
Converted into a Voting Rule: A Response to Gersen and Vermeule's Proposal, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 248, 250 (2007), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-
part/administrative-law/chevron-should-not-be-converted-into-a-voting-rule:-a-response-to-
gersen-and-vermeule%27s-proposall (providing further analysis of Revesz's study).
246. Zaring, supra note 203, at 180. Professor Zaring acknowledged, however, that his
finding did not mean that politics do not play a role in adjudicating agency fact finding. Instead,
he wrote,
There is no question that they do in many cases.. .. The implication may be
that-at least for fact-based cases-there is a range of acceptable agency behavior.
Within that range, agencies may find the facts they like without much ideological
policing by judges, either because fact-based cases are viewed as cases for smaller
stakes than are law-based cases . . . or because ideological commitments match
unevenly with factual findings.
Id
247. E.g., Strauss, supra note 137, at 965-67 (discussing several instances when President
Clinton made his views on controversial rules known).
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goals of the proposals. 24 8 Disclosure of information about the content and
extent of presidential influence in those cases could prompt, or at least
facilitate, partisan judging where there might not have been partisan judging in
its absence.
H. Erosion of Consistency
There is one other unintended consequence that could flow from the
proposals of Professor Watts and Professor Mendelson. To the extent that both
proposals envision courts according greater deference to agencies when the
agencies' decisions are based on presidential influences, the proposals could
provide further impetus for both midnight rulemaking and dawn rescissions of
rules. If a President knows that an agency's decision will be entitled to more
deference because of the President's influence, the President has a greater
incentive to play an active role in implementing policies through rulemaking
throughout the his or her term in office, especially at the end of the term when
the President will not suffer any political repercussions for implementing those
policies.249 Similarly, a President who is beginning a term in office has a
greater incentive to play an active role in undoing the midnight rules enacted
by the outgoing President, when the President knows that courts will accord
deference to the new policies because the President supports them.250 If the
proposals exacerbate both midnight rulemaking and dawn rescissions, as they
might, they will greatly interfere with the interests of the regulated community
and the public in the uniformity, reliability, and consistency of agency decision
making.
Midnight rulemaking and dawn rescissions are prevalent across presidential
administrations.251 A recent study by Jay Cochran III of the Mercatus Center
at George Washington University documented sharp increases in agency
rulemaking at the end of presidential terms for the past five decades.252 Jason
Loring and Liam Roth noted that the EPA, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), and the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA) issued forty percent of their 1992-1993 rules and
fifty-one percent of their
248. See supra Parts III-IV.
249. Jack M. Beermann, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REv. 947, 956 (2003).
250. See Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the "Midnight"
Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1441, 1444 (2005).
251. See Jack M. Beermann, Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 NW U. L. REV. 352, 360
(2009); Loring & Roth, supra note 250, at 1441.
252. Jay Cochran 111, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase Significantly
During Post-Election Quarters 3 (March 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Mercatus Center at George Mason University), available at http://www.mercatus.org
/sites/default/files/publication/TheCinderellaConstraint(1).pdf.
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2000-2001 rules in the last five weeks prior to the change of a presidential
administration.253
Professor Jack Beermann has identified several reasons for midnight
rulemaking, including:
(1) the natural human tendency to work a deadline ... ; (2) hurrying
to take as much action as possible near the end of the term to project
the administration's agenda into the future; (3) waiting to take
potentially controversial action until the end of the term when the
political consequences are likely to be muted; and (4) delay by some
external force that prevented the administration from taking desired
action until late in the term.254
Critics of midnight rulemaking argue that: (1) it is an inefficient way to make
policy, as oversight is limited during the midnight period; (2) the haste with
which the rules are adopted often results in rulemaking errors; and (3) the
process undermines political accountability.25 5  Consequently, many critics
argue that measures should be implemented to reduce midnight rulemaking.256
Unfortunately, the proposals of Professors Watts and Mendelson could
incentivize midnight rulemaking.
Regarding dawn rescissions of rules, some Presidents aggressively rescind
or revise midnight regulations of their predecessors. President William J.
Clinton, for instance, amended or repealed fifty-seven percent of the midnight
regulations issued by President George H.W. Bush's administration through
257EPA, NHTSA, and OSHA. Some academics suggest that Presidents may be
reluctant to revise midnight rules because it may be difficult to justify the
changes under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as applied in State
Farm.258
In the past, several academics have suggested that changing the manner in
which the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is applied to the rescissions or
revisions of rules, to rovide more deference for agencies, could reduce
midnight rulemaking.25 If it is easier for a new administration to undo the
former administration's rules, the former administration has less of an
incentive to issue rules on the way out of office.
253. See Loring & Roth, supra note 250, at 1454.
254. See Beermann, supra note 248, at 352 (footnote omitted).
255. Loring & Roth, supra note 249, at 1448.
256. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 251, at 353-54, 359-60; Loring & Roth, supra note
250, at 1449; Andrew P. Morriss et al., Between a Hard Rock and a Hard Place: Politics,
Midnight Regulations and Mining, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 551, 597 (2003).
257. See Loring & Roth, supra note 250, at 1456. However, the administration of President
George W. Bush only amended or repealed nineteen percent of the midnight rules issued by
President Clinton through EPA, OSHA, and NHTSA. Id.
258. Id. at 1457; Beermann, supra note 251, at 361.
259. See Beermann, supra note 251, at 359-60; Loring & Roth, supra note 250, at 1460.
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Although that is true to some extent, there is a political cost that the new
administration must 2ay to rescind or revise the prior administration's
midnight rulemaking, and the political cost may be too high in some cases.
Thus, changing the application of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard as
applied to revisions or rescissions of rules will not eliminate the incentive for
Presidents to engage in midnight rulemaking. Further, Professors Watts's and
Mendelson's proposals are different from the prior proposals that were targeted
at reducing midnight rulemaking. Watts's and Mendelson's proposals would
modify the application of the arbitrary-and-capricious standard not only for
rescissions or revisions of rules, but for the midnight rulemaking engaged in by
an outgoing administration.261 Thus, their proposals provide increased
incentives for an outgoing administration to engage in midnight rulemaking,
which counterbalances any reduction in the incentive for midnight rulemaking
due to increased deference for the rescissions by the incoming administration.
The combination of an increased incentive for both midnight rulemaking and
dawn rescissions could have significant ramifications for the stability of the
law. If courts usher in a new era of deference based on presidential influence,
so that it is much easier for agencies to change policies and rules whenever a
new President is elected, agency decisions could become less reliable, uniform,
and consistent, and the public and regulated community may find it more
difficult to anticipate what the law will be following the next change in
administration.
VI. CONCLUSION
The goals of the reform proposals of Professors Watts and Mendelson are
laudable. To the extent that the President and executive branch are exerting
influence over the policies and rules developed by agencies, disclosure of that
influence increases accountability of agencies and the executive branch,
increases opportunities for effective public participation in the decision making
process, and improves the quality of agencies' decision making. Supporters of
the proposals also claim that the proposals will reduce ossification of agency
rulemaking by increasing the deference that courts accord to agencies, and that
the proposals will reduce the distortion of science by agencies. However,
Professors Watts and Mendelson acknowledge that there may be significant
problems in implementing their proposals, including difficulties in identifying
permissible influences for agencies to consider under Watts's proposal and
difficulties in enforcement under Mendelson's proposal. The architects of the
proposals also recognize that, even with their reforms in place, agencies may
be reluctant to disclose the full extent of presidential involvement in decision
making when such a disclosure would not benefit the agencies.
260. See Beermann, supra note 251, at 353.
261. See supra Parts III-IV (proposing increased deference whenever presidential or political
factors influence an agency's decision).
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In addition to the problems that Professors Watts and Mendelson
acknowledge, the proposals may have some unintended consequences.
Changing the application of the "hard look" arbitrary-and-capricious analysis
might ultimately have little effect, in practice, on the rate at which courts
uphold agencies' rulemaking. If the increased disclosure of presidential and
executive-branch influences does not equate to greater success for agencies in
litigation, and if the new procedures for disclosure increase the time and cost
for rulemaking, the reforms could increase, rather than decrease, the
ossification of rulemaking. This could divert more of the agencies'
policymaking to policy statements, guidance documents, and other informal
tools, which limit opportunities for public participation and limit the public's
ability to access the law. The increased disclosure of presidential and
executive-branch influence in rulemaking might also facilitate partisan
judging. Moreover, it might erode consistency and certainty for regulated
communities and the public by encouraging agencies to change important
policies and interpretations of law with each new administration. Ultimately,
the costs of the reform proposals might outweigh the accountability and
transparency benefits of the proposals, especially when the proposals might not
achieve those benefits due to the implementation hurdles acknowledged by the
reformers.
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